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Regional Planning: 





Nowadays, regional planning at the 
national level is present in most at-
tempts at social change both in devel-
oped and developing countries. The 
author criticizes the lack of a suitable 
methodology for conducting the plan-
ning process at the level of any given 
region, emphasizes the limitations, 
deriving from the degree of openness 
and relative smallness of the regions, 
as regards their impact on decision-
making, and proposes a process of 
regional planning which gives promi-
nence to the political aspects associ-
ated with the strengthening of regional 
bargaining power both with the central 
government and with other institutions 
outside the region. In proposing a 
process of "negotiated" planning, the 
author puts the case for utilizing this 
process as an instrument for strength-
ening the democratic structure of 
society. 
'The author is a staff me ruber of the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) of the United Nations. 
Introduction 
Tribute has been paid to Keynes on many 
counts, but few would link his name with 
regional development planning. Neverthe-
less, the influence of Keynes' thought on 
Roosevelt played a decisive part in shaping 
the "New Deal" as part of the response to the 
recession that hit the United States towards 
the end of the 1920s. The setting up by the 
United States Federal Government of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, with-
out the favourable conditions for govern-
ment intervention created by the "New 
Deal". It is probably true to say that many 
specialists in regional development view the 
TVA as the first landmark in the still brief 
history of regional development planning, at 
least in relation to the capitalist economies. 
What has happened in regional plan-
ning in the almost half a century which has 
passed since then? It is not a lengthy matter 
to describe the broad outlines of its evolu-
tion during this period, particularly with 
reference to Latin America. 
The influence of the TVA "model" finds 
its maximum expression in the creation of 
the Venezuelan Guayana Development Cor-
poration at the beginning of the past decade, 
although a series of regional agencies had 
already been created in various Latin Amer-
ican countries before this, mainly for the 
purpose of controlling and exploiting energy 
and natural resources situated in peripheral 
regions. The Superintendency of the San 
Francisco River Valley in Brazil and the 
Federal Commissions of the principal river 
basins in Mexico are notable examples. 
The fact is that, up to the middle of the 
1960s, practically all the efforts relating to 
regional development planning in Latin 
America (as indeed in other parts of the 
world) formed part of schemes for partial 
peripheral development, promoted some-
times by the centre and sometimes by the 
periphery itself, with a variety of objectives 
ranging from the reconstruction of zones 
affected by natural disasters to the political 
control of potentially conflictive situations 
on the periphery. In an earlier paper the 
author presented a typology of all these 
134 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 7 / April 1979 
modes of regional development (Boisier, 
1976, a). 
From the middle of the 1960s up to the 
present time, these partial peripheral devel-
opment schemes have been increasingly 
replaced by schemes for general peripheral 
development, once again promoted some-
times by the centre and sometimes by the 
periphery. These general peripheral devel-
opment schemes represent what is currently 
known as regional planning at the national 
level or interregional planning. Whatever 
the label used, it refers in this case to an 
attempt to organize and direct the devel-
opment process with an eye to the problems, 
potentialities and interests of all the regions 
of the country. This had led to the designing 
of multi-level planning systems and proces-
ses in which the regional dimension is 
incorporated at a level of conceptualization 
and decision-making similar to that of the 
traditional global and sectoral dimensions. 
This change has come about for a variety 
of reasons, both theoretical and practical, 
which have been dealt with at great length in 
recent literature and therefore need not be 
repeated here. The United Nations has 
played an important part in the dissemina-
tion of this national approach to regional 
planning, both through technical assistance 
projects in this field and more particularly 
through the work of some of its agencies, past 
and present, which have specialized to 
varying extents in this subject, such as the 
United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD, Geneva, Switzer-
land), the United Nations Centre for Region-
al Development (UNCRD, Nagoya, Ja-
pan) and the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning (ILPES, 
Santiago, Chile). 
From a methodological standpoint, im-
portant advances have been made in each of 
the stages involved in the design of a 
regional plan of national scope, as well as in 
theoretical and empirical knowledge of 
existing situations and explanatory hypo-
theses. We know how to make good diagno-
ses (though there is plenty of room for 
improvement in their interpretation) and 
have considerably clarified the nature and 
interrelation of the various objectives of 
regional development; we have developed 
quantitative models, both simple and com-
plex, to convert these objectives into targets 
and to analyse the crucial problem of target 
coherence (Gruchman, 1976); we have made 
significant progress in. defining the nature 
and content of regional development strate-
gies, and we have built up quite a good 
knowledge of economic and institutional 
policies and instruments for promoting re-
gional development, though of course all 
this can be improved and refined. 
In brief, we have succeeded in creating 
a creditable image as regional planners at the 
national level and we have been skillful 
enough to convince numerous governments 
of developed and developing countries of 
the need to prepare national plans for 
regional development. The growing profes-
sional and academic activity in this field 
throughout the world is proof of this. 
If the average age of the brotherhood of 
regional planners were around 60 years, 
there would be no reason to worry in the face 
of such a positive state of affairs. Retirement 
would be approaching, and perhaps we 
could gracefully evade the real problems 
and retire with all the prestige of intellectual 
innovators. Unfortunately it would appear 
that our people, while generally of mature 
age, are still far from old, and we may 
therefore find ourselves obliged to reply to 
some awkward questions posed by those 
who are actually responsible for preparing 
regional plans which will produce results in 
precarious circumstances. What shall we, 
the academics and experts, reply to the host 
of regional planners whom we ourselves 
trained when they ask us in chorus: How do 
we prepare in practice a development plan 
for a specific region that really works? 
For purely selfish motives, then, and 
even if only in order to preserve our image, it 
might be prudent to begin to prepare a 
reply now, before the clock strikes twelve, as 
it did for Cinderella, and before the spell of 
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enchantment with regional planning is 
broken. 
A paradox of the regional planning 
process at the national level is that we have 
developed and adopted this methodology as 
a reaction to the traditional development 
programmes for single regions considered in 
isolation, because it seems to us, with 
reason, that such programmes were suc-
cessful only in exceptional cases and over-
looked the essential fact that regional under-
development (or in some cases the total lack 
of development) , was not a fortuitous cir-
cumstance, but simply the inevitable result 
of a certain type of overall development 
(regardless, to some extent, even of the 
actual political and economic system), so 
that the particular problem of a region could 
not really be solved except in the wider 
context of the group of regions as a whole. 
T h e theoretical and practical bases of this 
were clearly established, and it remains a 
solid and incontrovertible fact. Thus, in 
preparing national plans for regional devel-
opment , we are confronted with the econom-
ic problem in its simplest and starkest 
form: shortage of resources in the face of a 
generally large number of regions, each with 
mult iple problems and different growth 
potentials. As the simple solution of equal 
sharing of the available resources is no use, 
we find ourselves obliged to determine 
regional priorities, so that national-level 
regional development plans conclude in 
glowing pronouncements about the brilliant 
future which awaits all the regions, but make 
concrete proposals for action in only two or 
three of them. The paradox is that at the 
other end of the road we find ourselves once 
again with the same initial problem, which is 
to prepare a development plan for one 
particular region (or for a few regions), 
al though of course now on more favourable 
terms, since we are presumably working 
within a well-defined national framework as 
regards strategies, policies and programmes. 
What is to be done? The obvious reply 
would appear to be : prepare the regional 
plan in the same way as the interregional 
one. Though apparently obvious, however, 
this solution would not appear to be the best. 
It may be that the problems is more complex 
than a simple scaled reduction of a methodol-
ogy. It may be that the theoretical bases of a 
national plan for regional development are 
not appropriate on a reduced scale (as may 
be the case, perhaps, with the theory of 
growth poles and growth centres). It may be 
that the analytical arsenal of the interregion-
al planner is excessively biased towards 
urban and industrial aspects, whereas these 
features may not be predominant in a 
particular region. It may be that the institu-
tional and administrative machinery of a 
region is simply incapable of operating in 
terms of a development plan. It may be that 
statistical and other information is scanty 
and inadequate at the micro-regional level of 
detail. All this and a great deal more is 
possible. 
Another response, also obvious in cer-
tain circumstances, would be to do nothing 
at all. This is certainly a valid response 
within a completely centralized regional 
planning scheme in which use is made, for 
example, of quantitative interregional pro-
gramming models, one output of which is 
precisely the programme of sectoral/region-
al growth and investment. The well-known 
"Rotterdam model" does in fact produce 
results which minimize the task of planning 
in each region. This type of response, 
however, though undoubtedly efficient, is 
highly centralized, permits little participa-
tion, and therefore in the last analysis is far 
from democratic. 
The problem described above may not 
be very serious in the case of the region 
which is given highest priority, as the greater 
part of the central government effort is 
usually concentrated there, but what is to be 
done in the case of a region which receives 
only second or third priority? This is where 
the problem arises in all its magnitude. If 
few official efforts are directed to such a 
region, there is no other alternative than to 
improve the conditions which make sell-
help possible. 
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The apparent inadequacy of the applica-
tion of more or less classic planning meth-
odologies to particular regions is reflected in 
the dissatisfaction of a number of institutions 
and experts with the normal procedures and 
in the search for new solutions. 
Thus, for example, Avron Bendavid has 
developed the so-called "concepts-strate-
gies-projects" approach (Bendavid, 1972) as 
a more realistic option for regional planning 
and has recently amplified the same idea in a 
more formal work (Bendavid and Waller, 
1975). The United Nations Centre for Re-
gional Development in Nagoya is preparing 
a project entitled: "Methods of planning for 
comprehensive regional development" — 
MPCRD (UNCRD, 1976), an ambitious 
project with the very objective of establishing 
a suitable method for the planning of 
individual regions in the context of Asian 
under-development. The United Nations 
Latin American Institute for Economic and 
Social Planning (ILPES) has tried out, in its 
assistance to subnational agencies in Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela, new methodologies 
and approaches for formulating develop-
ment plans for single regions. Some of these 
experiments have been published (Costa-
Filho, 1975; Valle, 1975). Van Raay has also 
recently examined this same problem from a 
wider standpoint (Van Raay, 1976) and the 
present author has also referred to the same 
topic on another occasion (Boisier, 1976, b). 
More recently, Stóhr and Tódtling 
(Stôhr and Tódtling, 1977) presented to the 
Seventeenth European Congress on Region-
al Science (Cracow, August 1977) an in-
teresting paper on this same subject, in 
which a strategy of "selective spacial clo-
sure" is proposed with a view to preserving 
regional autonomy and generating respon-
ses more in keeping with the particular 
problems of the regions. 
It is not difficult to understand the 
specialists' concern with seeking alternative 
planning methods for single regions. Quite 
apart from any other consideration, the basic 
question is that the development plan for a 
single region is in all probability directed 
towards the management of an economy 
which is essentially small in relative terms 
and in many cases in absolute terms as well. 
The priorities laid down in the national 
regional plan will assuredly be expressed in 
proposals to control the growth of the 
"centre" (coinciding generally with a metro-
politan-type region) and to stimulate the 
growth of one or more peripheral regions. 
Some of these are precisely the "small" 
regions. 
Some time ago the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America (CEPAL) prepared a 
study of the experiences of various Latin 
American countries in calculating the region-
al gross domestic product (CEPAL, 1975). 
An analysis of the relative participation of 
the regions, states or provinces in the 
national total gives a rough idea of the typical 
economic size of the territorial units which 
would come under an intra-regional devel-
opment plan. 
Thus, for example, in Argentina (1968) 
only two of the 24 provinces registered a 
share equal or superior to 10% of the GDP of 
the country; in Brazil (1968) only three of the 
22 states achieved this level of participation; 
in Chile (1970) three of the 12 regions; in 
Colombia (1964) three of the 18 sections; in 
Ecuador (1965) two of the 16 provinces; in 
Mexico (1970) one of the 32 states; in 
Panama (1968) three of the 9 provinces, and 
in Peru (1965) three of the eight regions. 
This corroborates what was stated earlier, 
namely, the very small field of operations to 
which the preparation of a regional plan is 
normally confined. The fact that most of 
these geographic units correspond to admin-
istrative divisions rather than to planning 
regions in no way invalidates the argument. 
The immediate consequence of this 
should be the recognition of the extreme 
importance of what we might call the 
parametric environment in planning the 
development of a specific region. In other 
words, the conditions, events and decisions 
external to the region will normally have a 
more significant impact on its development 
than the internal elements themselves. 
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This has naturally not passed unnoticed 
by economists and regional growth theorists 
and the most widely known texts contain 
warnings about the different degrees of 
openness of the regional and national econo-
mies, while quite a lot of progress has been 
made in the formalization of externally 
induced regional growth models (Siebert, 
1969). In reality, however, we are dealing 
with something which goes beyond mere 
economic openness (viewed as the relation 
between the volume of external trade and 
the domestic product) and is more complex 
than the mere recognition of the role of 
external demand and external investment in 
regional growth, as these aspects are treated 
in the models for the economic base, 
interregional multipliers and growth. The 
question which immediately arises is the 
following: Are the planning methodologies 
equipped to take account of the parametric 
environment? 
Is it not rather the case, as several 
authors suggest (Gutiérrez, Ortiz and Villa-
mil, 1971), that the planning methodologies 
were designed to deal with economic sys-
tems which are relatively closed or, at least, 
more autonomous as regards their control? If 
this is so, it might be necessary to revise the 
planning processes, especially from the 
standpoint of management and control, in 
order to link them closely with systems 
analysis. The planning of a region will 
constitute a typical case of control of an open 
system. 
From an operational standpoint, sys-
tems analysis could make a substantial 
contribution to the restatement of the forms 
of planning fora region. From the conceptu-
al standpoint, on the other hand, it seems 
essential to make a distinction between 
developmental planning and adaptive plan-
ning, in order to redefine the form assumed 
by the planning process in a region (Fried-
mann, 1973). According to Friedmann: 
"Planning for change can assume two 
basic forms according to a criterion 
relative to the autonomy of planning 
units in the making of decisions. Under 
developmental planning, there is a high 
degree of autonomy with respect to the 
setting of ends and the choice of means; 
under adaptive planning, most deci-
sions are heavily contingent on the 
actions of others external to the planning 
system. In practice, of course, most 
planning decisions are made along the 
continuum between complete autonomy 
and complete dependency, and the 
behaviour of planning systems will 
differ according to the distribution of 
decision functions between the two 
extremes. For instance, planning for 
urban development at the level of the 
city will usually be more adaptive than 
developmental: to a great extent, it will 
need to respond or adapt to external 
forces, such as shifts in the locational 
preferences of national industries, 
which the municipality cannot signifi-
cantly influence through its own actions. 
In planning for national development, 
on the other hand, the public authorities 
are able to control a larger number of the 
variables relevant to their own objec-
tives, so that the nation is much more 
independent than any of its municipali-
ties. Even among nations, however, 
there may be differences in the degree 
of dependency on external forces; and a 
small, weak nation such as Haiti has to 
plan more adaptively —if it is planning 
at all— than the city of Sao Paulo. 
"What are the main differences in the 
expected behaviour between develop-
mental and adaptive planning? I should 
not like to take the metaphor too far, but 
it may be instructive to compare the 
relationship between developmental 
and adaptive planning with that which 
exists between a slave and his master. 
Assuming that the slave remains a slave 
(and of course he may decide not to), 
how does he promote his personal 
interests? Four forms of behaviour come 
to mind: 
" 1 . The slave will strive to influence 
his master's will in his own favour, 
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without any particular end in view, but 
rather seeking a reasonable relationship 
and seizing any change of immediate 
gratification that may arise. 
"2. The slave will seek to increase his 
sphere of independent choice and 
action. 
"3 . The ambitions of the slave will 
generally be more modest than those of 
his master. But, in his desire to achieve 
greater independence, he may adapt his 
aims more and more to those of his 
master, imagining a joint or common 
interest that he may share by adhesion. 
This is the typical feudal relationship. 
"4. The slave may have recourse to 
political manipulation with a view to 
changing his master's will in favour of 
his own interest. The term "political 
manipulation" should be understood in 
this context in its broadest sense and 
may include excessive subservience, 
flattery, insinuation, subtle pressure, 
deceit and other forms of indirect ma-
nipulation. 
"Now, it seems that a form of behaviour 
similar to that of the slave is a feature of 
adaptive planning too. There will be a 
tendency to push decisions upwards to 
centres of developmental planning 
where the parameters for choice at 
lower levels may be changed. In at-
tempting this, the lower-level planning 
systems will generally rely on political 
manipulation to achieve their ends. 
{Underlined by the present author.) So 
that negotiations with the central author-
ities may be conducted with equal 
technical competence, however, coun-
terplanning may be added to political 
action. Since, on the government's side, 
any bargaining in a complex advanced 
economic system is usually done by 
qualified technical experts, the contend-
ing parties must enter negotiations at 
least as well prepared." 
I 
Nature of planning for a single region 
However an economic plan is defined, it 
implies a finite and arbitrary collection of 
decisions which are taken a priori to affect 
the probable course of certain events. These 
decisions mainly concern the allocation of 
resources and administrative forms and 
procedures {including the setting up of new 
institutions). A decision is only such when it 
affects a variable or circumstance which is 
contained within the sphere of control of the 
decision-maker {I cannot "decide" to put an 
end to racial segregation in South Africa, for 
example). As will be seen at once, this 
interpretation of the nature of a plan calls 
into question the very idea of a "regional 
plan" in many cases, at least when the plan 
for the region is regarded as an instrument of 
and for the regional administration, that is, as 
a regionally autonomous process. 
What are the economic resources which 
can be managed by regional administration? 
If we confine the scope of the question to the 
financial aspect it is not difficult to answer. 
First, the region may use resources stem-
ming from the product of certain direct and 
indirect taxes which the tax legislation 
concedes to the local regional governments 
{some taxes on property, certain taxes on 
services, etc.). Secondly, the region may use 
its own revenue (holdings and shares in 
certain regional economic activities). Third-
ly, the region may in some cases make use of 
the local, national or international capital 
market, either by issuing bonds and deben-
tures or by contracting obligations. Fourthly, 
the region may use resources transferred by 
the central government. 
Are these resources substantial? The 
reply in general is that they are not. In view 
of the centralized tax and budgetary systems 
prevalent in many countries (in all Latin 
American countries with the possible excep-
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tion of Brazil) the regional or local tax 
income is minimal, as any local authority 
would hasten to confirm. Local revenues are, 
in the overwhelming majority of cases, quite 
negligible; only in exceptional cases con-
nected with the exploitation of a natural 
resource or the enjoymeiit of some special 
privilege are they significant. The regional 
utilization of the capital market is still in its 
infancy in most of the developing countries 
and it seems unlikely that the poorer regions 
could benefit from such a system, although 
the possibility cannot be entirely discount-
ed. The transfer of resouroes from the central 
government, potential in some cases and real 
in others, constitutes the most reliable and 
important source of help. This excludes, of 
course, the budgetary allocations assigned to 
the region by sectoral government agencies, 
since these grants are decided by the 
agencies and not by the region. It follows, 
therefore, that when speaking of transfers we 
are thinking of fixed sums which the central 
government places at the free disposition of 
the regional administration. The empirical 
evidence is that, even in the countries where 
national regional development funds have 
been established, these transfers are not 
very substantial. 
It is clear, therefore, that regional 
decisions on the allocation of resources are 
necessarily very limited and in any case 
insufficient to contribute in any marked de-
gree to the solution of the main problems of 
the region. 
With regard to institutional or adminis-
trative decisions, the situation is no better. 
Given the pronounced degree of centraliza-
tion of the public administration in many 
countries, and particularly those of Latin 
America, the regional administrative ma-
chinery consists (when it exists as such) 
chiefly of regional branches of the national 
agencies and only to a very small extent of 
genuinely regional bodies. Even though 
such branches may be formally subject to 
the regional authorities, there is no doubt 
that in a real sense they are subject to the 
authority of their own central headquarters. 
Thus the scope of regional decisions in this 
field is also very restricted and, with scant 
resources, it may be unrealistic to think of 
establishing new institutions. 
These brief considerations should be 
sufficient to rule out (in most cases) the 
possibility of making a regional plan in the 
classic sense, i.e., a set of decisions con-
trolling variables which are really con-
trollable. A planning process for a region 
should therefore be designed to make viable 
and to maximize the capacity to intervene 
in the parametric environment of the region. 
The form which such intervention takes 
will depend on the relative balance of power 
between the intervener and the intervened. 
The greater the relative power of the 
intervener, the greater likelihood of an 
authoritative or forceful intervention; the 
less this relative power, the greater the 
likelihood that the intervention will become 
negotiation. As we have seen that the typical 
size of a region is relatively small, it is 
reasonable to assume that the power of 
regions to intervene in their parametric 
environment will be limited, and it is 
equally reasonable to assume that in such a 
case the region will tend to change the 
possibility of intervention into negotiation 
with the agents comprising the parametric 
environment, basically the central govern-
ment and secondarily the national public 
and private enterprises, the transnational 
corporations and the external market itself. 
In this case the main objective of 
regional development planning will not 
be to mobilize the internal resources of the 
region (though this will always be a com-
ponent of regional development) but to 
maximize the regional capacity for negotia-
tion. 
John Friedmann, however, in his study 
cited above, presents a different view. He 
writes: 
"Different degrees of autonomy and 
dependency in decision-making tend to 
be mirrored in a hierarchy of planning 
authorities which stand in more or less 
systematic technical and political rela-
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Hon to one another, each level having 
its appropriate function and decision 
power. Since each higher level is capa-
ble of changing some of the relevant 
conditions for decisions at all lower 
levels, and since every change of this 
sort represents some change of policy, 
programming —the detailed specifica-
tion of investments in volume, time, and 
place— tends to be emphasized at 
lower levels. Or, put in another way, 
developmental planning tends to shade 
off into policy making, adaptive plan-
ning into programming. In fact, how-
ever, the two become mixed in varying 
proportion, according to the point on 
the autonomy/dependency continuum 
where planning occurs. 
"In developmental planning, the role 
of political institutions for guidance and 
conflict resolution becomes obviously 
crucial, for it is here that the basic policy 
decisions are made and that the clashing 
interests of adaptive planners must be 
resolved. Developmental planning is 
not only a technical, but also, and to a 
large degree, a political function." 
(Friedmann, 1973.) 
Further on it will be seen that, precisely 
because of the decisional limitations de-
riving from the size and degree of openness 
of the regions, regional adaptive planning in 
most cases assumes a character quite distant 
from that of "programming", contrary to the 
implications of Friedmann's view, though 
this is valid for many situations. 
As Gutiérrez, Ortiz and Villamil ob-
serve: "To treat the countries (or regions in 
this case) as open systems implies the 
following: first, it is necessary to identify the 
interchange network between the country 
(region) and its "setting"; secondly, it is 
necessary to define in detail the nature of the 
relations between the country (region) and 
other countries (regions); thirdly, it implies 
a high degree of exogenous action in respect 
of the critical variables in the planning or 
decision-making process" (Gutiérrez, Ortiz 
and Villamil, 1971). 
The same authors add: "An open system 
can exist under conditions of dependence or 
interdependence, where the former reflects 
a condition of domination and the latter of 
reciprocity". 
They also state that: "Political depen-
dence involves or imposes economic and 
social dependence. In these cases, which 
approximate to the conditions of planning 
by regions or subnational units, there is a 
hierarchy in the planning system and the 
best that can be done is to try to minimize the 
negative effects and to maximize the bene-
fits of the dependent relationship, within the 
limits imposed by the dominant system". 
In a later and more detailed study of 
the subject, when discussing the problem of 
decision-making in a situation of inadequate 
resources, Gutiérrez and Villamil affirm: 
"The relative inadequacy of resources 
should be understood in the context of lack 
of control or in terms of certain limitations 
in respect of policy options" (Gutiérrez, 
Villamil, 1973). These limitations on the 
design of policy options are a direct result 
of the small size of certain countries and 
regions. 
From the foregoing observations, cer-
tain important conclusions emerge which 
help to redefine the scope of the planning 
process for a single region. In the first place, 
there is the need for a thorough clarification 
of the structure and functioning of what we 
have called the "parametric environment" of 
the region: a task which will be included 
within the regional diagnosis. In the second 
place, the authors quoted reaffirm the idea 
that the planning of a region implies the 
management of a system which is dependent 
from the standpoint of decision-making: 
a feature which will have an effect —as we 
shall see later— on the relative roles of the 
plan and the regional strategy. In the third 
place, the limited choice in the design of 
policy options is seen to stem from the small 
size of the economic system of a region, a 
circumstance which will necessarily affect 
the approach, procedures and machinery of 
regional planning. 
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Accordingly, it seems clear that in 
practice regional planning is as much a 
process of negotiation and management as a 
technical exercise, and the decision-making 
framework within which the planners and 
other groups function stands out as a subject 
worthy of special analysis. Precisely this 
argument is put forward by Dunham in his 
examination for the case of Ghana — of the 
formation of spatial structures as a result of 
the interplay of group interests (Dunham, 
1976). 
Another important aspect which calls for 
comment concerns the notion of strategy 
in the context of the planning process for 
a single regional and its relation to the 
concept of the plan as this has been outlined 
above. 
A regional development strategy can be 
defined with some precision in the following 
terms: "A regional development strategy is a 
limited set of important decisions which, on 
the basis of the possible reactions of the 
environment, seeks as its principal aim to 
maximize change in a regional system while 
at the same time minimizing the adverse 
reactions of the system" (Boisier, 1976, b). 
In the case of regional planning at the 
national level the most important decisions 
relating to the strategy are: (i) the definition 
of the degree of tension that a system can 
support, that is, the specification of the 
intensity of control that can be applied to 
the "centre" in order to obtain surpluses 
from there which can be transferred to the 
"periphery"; and (ii) the definition of the 
style of regional development which is 
sought, by means of the evaluation of and 
selection from a number of important op-
tions (e.g. horizontal development versus 
vertical development). In the same perspec-
tive of regional planning at the national 
level, the regional strategy complements the 
plan, since, taking the country as a whole, 
most of the decisions relating to the devel-
opment of the regional system are made 
within the sphere of control of the country 
itself. Thus, the concept of the plan (as a 
set of pure decisions) becomes relatively 
more important than the concept of the 
strategy (as a set of stochastic decisions 
and procedures). 
In the case of a single region, particular-
ly if this is small and open, the relations 
between strategy and plan are different. 
Given that in this case most of the elements 
of control of the system are external, the 
development strategy for a single region has 
another connotation, since in these circum-
stances the strategy seeks to maximize the 
possibility of generating decisions on the 
part of the external elements of control (the 
agents of the parametric environment) 
which are suitable and advantageous for 
the development of the region. In this 
sense, the development strategy for a region 
is seen to be closely associated with concrete 
procedures for action rather than with the 
creation of conditions for a group of agents 
to act in accordance with a pre-arranged 
scheme, as in the case of a national strategy 
for regional development. From a comple-
mentary point of view, it can be stated that 
the development strategy for a region seeks 
to reduce the degree of uncertainty in the 
negotiating procedures between the region 
and the external agents. 
Gonsidering that the pure decisions 
capable of being taken by the region are 
relatively few, the plan of the region is 
comparatively less important than the 
strategy, so that in this case the plan is 
complementary to the strategy: the opposite 
to the relation which exists at the national 
level. The following diagram illustrates the 
diffèrent relationship between strategy and 
plan in the case of a regional system as 
compared with a single region. 
Mention should be made, however, of 
the relative character of such statements as: 
"The strategy is less important than the plan 
in the case of interregional planning", as 
the phrase "less important" simply means 
that there are more elements subject to 
control in one case than in another. It 
does not imply a reduction in the absolute 
importance of an adequate national strategy 
for regional development. 
142 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 7 / April 1979 
To sum up, then, planning for a region 
consists of two components: a decisional 
component (the plan proper) and a pro-
cedural component (the strategy, which 
includes the specification of the fields to be 
negotiated and the machinery of negotia-
tion). 
COMPONENTS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS 
STRATEGY 
PLAN 
INTRAREGIONAL PLANNING > INTERREGIONAL PLANNING 
II 
The regional diagnosis revisited 
How then can we design a practical plan-
ning process for a single region which 
fulfills the foregoing requirements? 
Saint-Exupéry said that founding the 
future involves first and foremost thinking 
about the present, and hence acquaintance 
with the region itself, its potentialities, its 
limitations and the factors operating behind 
these limitations is the first task and the 
first stage in regional planning, whatever 
form this may assume. A good diagnosis is 
the chief requisite of the plan. 
Though this is obvious enough, and 
though we have built up an appreciable 
body of experience in the preparation of 
economic diagnoses, it is no less certain that 
—at least in the case of Latin America— 
the regional diagnoses so far known to us are 
relatively good descriptions rather than 
adequate interpretations. Such descriptions 
are useful, but without an interpretation 
their value is practically nil. 
Diagnoses can be regarded as a process 
in itself, for which certain inputs are needed 
and from which certain outputs are derived. 
The transformation of the inputs into outputs 
presupposes some specific action at this 
stage. 
The first input needed for the diagnosis 
consists of information, both on the region 
and on what has been called the regional 
parametric environment. Since the object 
is to prepare a practical planning method-
ology, ano| this implies both feasibility and 
timeliness, we cannot be very demanding at 
the outset as regards information. We know 
perfectly well that in this respect there will 
be a general lack of regional statistical 
information, but we cannot wait for modern 
information systems to be designed and put 
into effect if the aim is really to achieve 
something in the short term. The "art" of 
regional planning in this case consists of the 
intelligent use of indirect information, 
national data sources, and any odd bit of 
information available, with a view to extract-
ing facts about the region. 
Information for the diagnosis is of three 
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different types. In the first place statistical 
information is required, i.e., data concern-
ing the state and performance of the princi-
pal regional and extraregional variables. 
Secondly, there is a need for political 
information, referring to the strategies, 
plans, policies and projects promoted by the 
central government. Thirdly, information 
must be built up from opinions, i.e., the 
objective and subjective appraisals of the 
regional actors (authorities, entrepreneurs, 
workers, etc.) regarding the problems and 
potentialities of the region. 
With regard to the first category —sta-
tistical information— it will be useful to 
prepare in advance as complete a list as 
possible of the desired data (examples of 
such lists can be found in various textbooks 
on regional planning). The purpose of this 
list is not to amass all the information 
suggested (this would prolong the whole 
process) but to use the list as a guide in order 
to, first, prepare a second shorter list of the 
items available or obtainable with very little 
effort and, second, to establish an order of 
priority in relation to the data (e.g., in a pre-
eminently agricultural region industrial 
information might be easier to obtain but it 
would obviously not have top priority). It 
would seem that the essential point here is to 
study in depth the statistical sources of 
national data (censuses, social accounts, 
etc.) in order to extract from these the data 
concerning the region. This is a procedure 
which, if well carried out, usually provides 
more information than is generally sup-
posed. 
The aim of collecting the political 
information, as already noted, is mainly to 
gain a clear picture of national economic 
policies (e.g., monetary policy or policy on 
public expenditure), of sectoral policies 
(agriculture, industry), and of directly 
productive investment projects as well as 
social and infrastructural projects proposed 
by national government agencies, the objec-
tive being to assess the possible impact of 
this set of decisions on the region. In some 
cases this can be quantified: for example, the 
number of housing units which the Ministry 
of Housing proposes to build in the region 
or the number of jobs which an industrial 
project will generate, but in other cases it 
will not be so easy: for example, it is difficult 
to assess the impact of the country's mone-
tary policy on the region. 
In view of the nature of the planning 
process proposed, the political information 
is extremely important, since it refers pre-
cisely to the regional parametric environ-
ment or, at least, to the most important part of 
this: the action of the central government. 
Consequently, a very serious effort should 
be made to obtain this information and 
organize it effectively. 
The information relating to the econom-
ic policies promoted by the central govern-
ment should be at least summarily assessed 
by the regional working group. A very 
detailed analysis is not necessary at this 
stage; it is enough for the working group to 
be able to give a reasonably informed 
opinion as to whether this or that policy is 
positive or not in relation to the develop-
ment envisaged for the region. 
On the other hand, the opportunity 
arises, even at this stage of the regional 
planning process, to effectively bring into 
it both the regional and especially the 
national policy-makers of the public sector. 
It is not enough to seek information on 
policies and projects through a formal re-
quest nor does it suffice to have an under-
standing between the regional and sectoral 
planners. Interaction between regional 
political authorities, planners and national 
authorities is essential for the subsequent 
conversion of the plan into action. 
The information derived from opinion 
is an important complement to the two 
foregoing categories and its collection 
simultaneously provides an opportunity to 
incorporate into the planning process an-
other important set of actors : regional 
groups. This is useful both for tactical and 
doctrinal reasons. From the latter stand-
point, planning is conceived as a participa-
tive and socially integrating process, while 
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from the tactical point of view, the leaders 
of the regional social groups effectively 
complement the functions of the planner in 
respect of the missing information which 
they can and often do supply and in respect 
of problems of everyday life in the region 
which might pass unnoticed by the tech-
nician. Reference will be made below to the 
techniques which may be used to collect this 
information in a reasonably objective man-
ner. 
The second type of input required for 
the construction of the diagnosis is con-
cerned with the techniques of regional anál-
isis. The mere mention of this is apt to cause 
raised eyebrows, partly because there is a 
tendency to think of complicated economet-
ric techniques requiring speciallized skills 
and consuming enourmous amounts of time 
and resources. But if our concern is merely to 
prepare a feasible and timely plan, using 
scanty information, we shall naturally have 
to rely on more elementary techniques of 
analysis. 
It should be understood that two types 
of analytical techniques have to be used: (i) 
conventional techniques for the processing 
of statistical data, and (ii) non-conventional 
techniques for the processing of more sub-
jective information. Among the latter are 
exercises of the brainstorming type, the 
formation of think tanks, and the use of 
methods such as the delphi technique to 
identify priority problems, for example. 
Fagence, in Citizen Participation in 
Planning, devotes a whole chapter to ana-
lysing the ways and means of citizen 
participation in planning processes (Fagen-
ce, M., 1977). 
With regard to the conventional tech-
niques of regional analysis, descriptions of 
these can be found in various textbooks 
(Isard, I960; Boudeville, 1966; Bendavid, 
1974; Boisier, 1977). Clear preference 
should be given to those simple techniques 
for which data can be found in national 
statistical data sources (e.g., measures of 
concentration and of specialization, the shift 
and share method, gravity models, etc.). 
Since the procedure of learning-by-doing is 
more suited to the performance of less 
urgent tasks than those imposed on planners, 
there is a need in this case for the collabora-
tion of experts with sufficient theoretical 
knowledge and practical experience. 
The general aims of the diagnosis for 
this form of planning are: (i) to identify the 
main problems of the region, with their 
respective priorities; (ii) to identify the 
agents of the regional parametric environ-
ment; (iii) to establish the links between 
the problems and the conduct of these 
agents; (iv) to identify the chief regional 
growth potentialities, and (v) to project the 
future regional situation in the light of the 
probable behaviour of (i), (ii) and (iii). 
Accordingly, the output of the diagnosis 
will be: (i) a description; (ii) an interpreta-
tion; and (iii) a projection. 
The description relates to the actual 
state of the region and, as this cannot be an 
extended account, its content and formal 
layout should be planned in advance. The 
description can be arranged along the fol-
lowing lines: 
(a) Description of each territorial unit 
contained in the region (provinces, com-
munes, districts, etc.) as far as available in-
formation permits. This description should 
of course include details of physical features, 
economic features, socio-political features 
and inter-microregional relations; 
(b) description of the functioning of the 
whole system as defined by the units already 
described: e.g., what changes have occurred 
within a given period in the total regional 
population and.its intraregional distribution. 
The object of this type of analysis is to gain 
an approximate idea of the internal dynamics 
of the region; 
(c) description of the system of human 
settlements in the region both in its urban 
and rural dimension; 
(d) description of the transport and 
communications systems within the region 
and their external connexions; 
(e) description of the regional adminis-
trative system and procedures connected 
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with development, with special emphasis on 
the aspects of interagency co-ordination, 
faculties and delegation of functions. 
Another function of the description, as 
an output of the diagnosis, is to provide an 
account of the long-term evolution of certain 
key variables such as population and produc-
tion. This will enable the planner to distin-
guish between long-standing structural 
problems and short-run problems. 
The description also includes —and this 
is fundamental— an identification and order 
of priority of the main regional problems. No 
attempt should be made to draw up an over-
long list which would tend to represent 
subjective views rather than real problems. 
At this point an effort of imagination is 
required of the planners. Examples of the 
questions which might be asked as a help in 
identifying the problems are the following: 
1. Are there any marked deficiencies in the 
region's supply of natural resources? Is 
the deficiency (if any) real, or is it a 
question of lack of knowledge? 
2. Are there any marked deficiencies in the 
region's supply of human resources? 
3. What is the relationship between 1 and 
2? Is there a problem of saturation? Is 
there a problem of spatial under-oc-
cupation? 
4. Are there any marked deficiencies in the 
region's supply of economic and techno-
logical resources? 
5. What is the assessment of the economic 
growth of the region? Is it below the 
level which the conditions in 1,2,3 and 
4 above should permit? 
6. Does the region's location with re-
spect to national and international mar-
kets constitute a serious obstacle to 
exports? 
7. Are there acute problems of income 
distribution in the region? If so, are 
they radically different from similar 
problems at the national level? 
8. Are there institutional problems whose 
removal could of itself speed up region-
al growth? 
9. Are there typically social problems in 
the region, such as obvious segregation, 
racial questions, essentially conserva-
tive dominant groups, absence of social 
organizations, etc.? 
Although all these questions are impor-
tant, I have deliberately mingled questions 
referring to certain effects with those which 
refer rather to causes. I have done this for the 
purpose of showing the need to make an 
effort to separate the two; diagnoses very 
often present all these problems mixed up 
together, which makes the subsequent iden-
tification of policies more difficult. For 
example, regional economic growth is main-
ly an effect of causes connected with one or 
more of the other eight questions, but it may 
also be a cause of situations such as those 
connected with questions 4, 7 and 9. 
A discussion in depth of these and other 
questions among planners, authorities and 
community representatives will generally 
end in agreement on one of the following 
three points: the regional economic growth 
is apparently below the level which the sum 
total of regional resources should allow; or 
else the regional economic growth is consid-
ered satisfactory but it is clearly generating 
social problems which cannot be allowed to 
continue in the long-term; or finally, the 
regional economic growth cannot be raised 
above a level imposed by the supply of 
natural resources, and the remedy must be 
found in migration. 
In identifying the problems it is neces-
sary to go straight to the point and not be 
sidetracked. If a region is clearly short of 
housing, this is very likely an effect of faulty 
income distribution, over-rapid immigra-
tion, lack of adequate financial machinery or 
other reasons, but it rarely represents a 
substantive problem. It is important of 
course to identify this type of problem, but it 
is much more important to devote time and 
effort to those problems whose solution 
would have the greatest multiplier effect in 
dealing with other problems. 
Finally, the description includes an 
identification of the main regional poten-
tialities. The bases for this should be as 
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objective as possible. What regional ele-
ments, natural or not, could be used to better 
advantage? Has the region a good climate 
and beautiful scenery (tourism)? Has it soil, 
energy or mining resources of special impor-
tance (agroindustry, energy production, min-
ing)? Has it important markets (industry, 
commerce, services)? Has it universities or a 
special endowment of technical experts 
(research, technology-intensive industries)? 
Has it basic industries (complementary 
industries) ? How soon could these potential-
ities be exploited, and what would be the 
approximate volume of national and interna-
tional resources required? 
The second part of the output of the 
diagnosis consists, as already mentioned, of 
the interpretation of the data and facts 
described above. This is the most difficult 
and also the most important part of the 
diagnosis. It is the most difficult because 
what is needed in reality is a theory (or 
several alternative theories) to detect the 
causal relations between phenomena, so that 
action may be taken to deal with the causes 
and not just the effects. Here, moreover, it is 
necessary to link the regional problems with 
the parametric environment. 
I have some doubts as to the capacity of 
the regional theories (at least in their present 
state) to pass the test of practical applicabili-
ty. I believe that we have as yet advanced 
very little in this respect, so we shall have to 
adopt a more rudimentary procedure. 
First of all, it is necessary to identify the 
agents who operate in the regional paramet-
ric environment, their ways of operating, 
and their relative importance. 
The most important agent in the region-
al parametric environments is undoubtedly 
the national or central government. The 
national government influences the perfor-
mance of the regional economy through a 
series of decisions, the chief of which are 
concerned with: (i) global, sectoral and 
interregional economic policies; (ii) public 
investment which is not directly productive 
(infrastructure and provision of services); 
(iii) current expenditure; and (iv) adminis-
trative rules. The second important agent 
consists of the public enterprises located in 
the region, which affect the regional situa-
tion through decisions connected with: (i) 
the volume of production; (ii) the regional 
content of their activities (purchases of local 
inputs, linkages in general); and (iii) the 
regional investment and re-investment of 
these enterprises. Of parallel importance are 
the national private enterprises and the 
transnational enterprises, through their de-
cisions on production, regional content, the 
handling of profits and employment condi-
tions. The national and international com-
mercial banks are important through their 
financial decisions regarding the amount 
and cost of regional credit. Finally, the 
external market is another important agent in 
the parametric environment, in terms of 
extraregional demand for goods and services 
and of nonresident spending in the region. 
Let us now suppose that the main 
problem of the region has been clearly 
established. In many cases, and in the last 
analysis, this problem will be that of an 
unsatisfactory economic growth rate in the 
region. This can be interpreted in absolute 
terms (a 0.4% annual growth rate is low by 
any standards) or in relative terms (a 5% 
regional growth rate compared with a 10% 
national growth rate), and the distinction 
may be useful further on. 
The question is, then: Why does the 
regional economy grow so slowly and what is 
the relation between this and the agents of 
the parametric environment? It will be 
necessary to carry out at least one check such 
as the following: 
(a) Inadequate amount of regional invest-
ment. Scantly regional investment could be 
due to one or more of the following causes: 
(i) Ignorance of the potentialities and 
resources of the region on the part of the 
private or public sector; 
(ii) lack of a suitable selection of project 
ideas and feasibility studies; 
(iii) high cost of financing or lack of long-
term financial resources; 
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(iv) lack of entrepreneurial groups in the 
region; 
(v) vague or erratic economic policies 
which affect the.investment process at the 
national level or which affect it particularly 
in the region; 
(vi) low political capacity of the region to 
press for the allocation of public resources; 
(vii) preferential policies for other re-
gions; 
(viii) low profitability of known projects 
or a general impression of lower returns in 
the region compared with similar invest-
ments in other regions. 
(b) Overall regional investment is ade-
quate, but it is conspicuously unbalanced. 
This tends to happen in the case of invest-
ment policies mainly directed towards pro-
viding an infrastructure (one may recall the 
case of the spread of industrial estates in 
several countries in the 1950s and 1960s) or 
producing energy which is ultimately used 
by other regions. 
(c) Overall regional investment is ade-
quate, but it has been primarily directed to 
sectors of slow national growth or to sectors 
having little integration in the regional 
economy. This case is quite common and 
generally derives from badly conceived 
industrialization strategies or strategies 
which simply ignore regional consid-
erations. 
(d) The regional market is small, as is the 
volume of exports. This could be the result of 
one or more of the following causes: 
(i) Small regional population; 
(ii) adequate population, but low levels 
of income and/or excessive income concen-
tration; 
(iii) high transport costs which hamper 
the sale of regional products outside the 
region (or lack of transport systems and 
media); 
(iv) obstacles of an administrative type 
which respect to international trade, in-
cluding shortage of information on markets; 
(v) higher production costs than those 
applying to similar activities with export 
potential situated in other regions; 
(vi) low regional capacity to attract non-
resident spending (no proper management 
of tourist resources, if these exist). 
(e) Lack of skilled manpower, including 
technicians, engineers and managers. This 
would hamper the putting into effect of 
otherwise viable projects. 
(f) Lack of (or inability to obtain) the 
technology needed for the exploitation of 
certain natural resources in the region. 
If it is possible to draw up a list of factors 
which are not autocorrelated and which 
provide a reasonable explanation of the 
problem of the slow growth of the region, it 
will not be difficult to identify the corre-
sponding agent of the parametric environ-
ment and the type of action (by the agent) 
most appropriate for the factor in question. 
Thus, for example, if the working group 
agrees on the primary importance of the 
factor "inadequate amount of regional in-
vestment" as the causal element of the slow 
growth, and if it has been established that 
this is mainly due to the "low political 
capacity of the region to press for the 
allocation of public resources", then this 
automatically identifies the agent (the gov-
ernment) and the type of action involved 
(public investment). Accordingly, it will 
now be possible to design a strategy for 
negotiating with the agent with a view to 
changing his conduct. 
Naturally, there is no simple recipe for 
carrying out the above exercise in practice 
and therefore much depends on the profes-
sional quality of the working group in 
carrying out this task of causal identification. 
Lastly, the third part of the output of the 
diagnosis is a set of regional macroeconomic 
projections in terms of a small number of key 
variables. To this end, an analysis of the 
present situation and its long-term evolution 
is combined with the probable effect of the 
known policies and projects. A projection 
prepared in terms of the probable evolution 
of the population, the level of economic 
activity and the land pattern use at the 
regional level will be useful not only in order 
to gain some idea of what the region might 
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become in ten or fifteen years' time if matters 
are left to develop on their own, but also 
because it makes it possible to verify the 
analysis of present problems and gain some 
idea of the new problems that might arise in 
the future. 
Before going on to the next stage of the 
planning process, it would be useful if the 
working group were to prepare a summary 
and conclusions on the basis of the diagno-
sis. The summary should centre on a clear 
presentation of a very small number of 
problems considered of priority importance 
for the region, their nature (a mere list of the 
problems is not sufficient) in terms of the 
manner in which they originated, their 
evolution (problems may either get worse or 
remain more or less constant), the relation 
between them (whether or not they are 
independent problems, and in the latter 
case, what type of linkage exists between 
them), and the relationship between each 
problem and the agents of the parametric 
environment whose actions in one way or 
another influence the state of the problem. 
Since this summary of the diagnosis will 
henceforth play a highly important role in 
the rest of the process, special attention 
should be paid to the way in which the 
conclusions are presented. Language that is 
somewhat over-technical may be useful 
when dealing with certain types of people, 
but possibly not with the most important. 
Therefore, an effort must be made to use 
clear and simple language that is intelligible 
to all. A number of well-known visual 
techniques (maps, graphs, scale models, 
etc.) could be most useful. An important 
though undoubtedly difficult point is to 
present the regional problems in terms of the 
main concerns of the person being dealt 
with, i.e., the appropriate agent of the 
parametric environment. If the basic con-
cern of those responsible for economic 
policy is, for example, the control of persis-
tent inflation, the region will not get very far 
by harping on a growth problem (whose 
solution might involve greater fiscal expen-
diture), since that would not be the answer to 
the main concern. In other words, the region 
should learn to "communicate" its prob-
lems, that is to say, to translate them into a 
language that reflects the interests of those to 
whom the problems are presented. Since a 
great many economic problems are inter-
dependent, it is by no means impossible 
—although neither is it a simple matter— to 
make such an adjustment. 
I l l 
Objectives and goals in the planning 
of a single region 
If the methodology used in regional plan-
ning at the national level (interregional 
planning) were also used at the regional 
level, once the diagnosis was completed it 
would be necessary to identify the develop-
ment objectives and then carry out the 
quantitative scaling of these objectives, i.e., 
to establish targets. 
A development "objective" is associ-
ated with a specific "state" of a certain 
variable in the image-objective. An objective 
is not an action in itself, but it necessarily 
implies an action. The action implied by an 
objective is precisely the policy defined in 
order that the variable may reach the desired 
"state". For example, a proposal such as "to 
redistribute income" is not an objective, 
since the use of the verbal form denotes an 
action. Correctly stated, the objective in this 
case would be: "income distribution of such 
and such a nature", which may or may not 
involve an action such as "to redistribute" in 
the sense of transferring current income 
from certain groups to others. Obviously, 
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the desired pattern of distribution (the 
objective) can be achieved through actions 
which have nothing to do with transfers. 
The fact that an objective is always 
associated with an action, without actually 
being an action as such, denotes the capacity 
of the social agent which establishes the 
objective to implement the relevant action. 
In order to implement an action (which is a 
policy), it must be possible to exercise 
control over the elements making up the 
action or policy, i.e., there must be capacity 
to handle the policy instruments. A regional 
objective such as "a distribution of regional 
income characterized by equal shares for 
labour and capital" may imply —as an 
action— a specific tax policy; if the objective 
is to have any real meaning, the region must 
in this case exercise control over the policy 
instruments — for example, it should have 
the capacity to establish a tax on capital. 
Otherwise, the objective —from the stand-
point of the region's decision-making capaci-
ty— will be of no value, since it will be 
nothing but a declaration of good intentions. 
It might well be asked, then, what is the 
point of establishing an objective for a 
region, such as attaining a growth rate for the 
product of 5.3% annually, which is a typical 
example of the kind of objective met with in 
practice? Leaving aside the fact that this is 
not really a correctly defined objective, let us 
ask ourselves what degree of control has any 
region over the ultimate determinants of 
growth? 
As noted earlier, the regions' area of con-
trol is usually very small, which to a large ex-
tent casts doubts on the possibility of endo-
genously determining regional objectives. It 
also implies that there would be no point in 
establishing the quantitative counterpart of 
the objectives, i.e., targets. This does not 
mean, however, that there are no regional 
objectives or targets; the problem lies not in 
whether they exist or not but in who has the 
actual capacity to determine them. In fact, 
objectives and goals will always exist and 
will always be established for each region. 
This will not be the exclusive responsibility 
of each region, however, but of a different 
decision-making authority. 
Gutiérrez, Ortiz and Villamil reach a 
similar conclusion in their study on the 
planning of open systems when they state 
the following: "This analysis raises the 
need, in the planning of open systems, for 
the objectives to be multiple rather than 
unidimensional. The objectives should not 
only optimize in terms of some economic 
variables, but should also endeavour to 
reduce the degree of uncertainty of the 
system, by replacing, wherever possible, 
uncontrollable variables by other variables 
that can be controlled" (Gutiérrez, Ortiz, 
Villamil, op. cit.). 
Let us assume that, as often happens, the 
above situation is disregarded and in pre-
paring the regional plan a good deal of 
energy is consumed in establishing objec-
tives and goals. For example, it is affirmed that 
the region should double the growth rate of 
the product over a certain period by means of 
an industrial expansion programme. Apart 
from the fact that this is doubtless outside the 
scope of the region's control, what would 
happen if the adjacent region were to set the 
same target? Are the two situations compati-
ble in terms of the use of scarce resources or 
the size of the markets? What would happen 
if not two, but six or even nine regions made 
similar proposals? 
Since a problem of this kind must 
necessarily have a consistent solution, this 
could take the form of an ex post adjustment, 
i.e., using the resources as far as they will go 
and meeting the requirements of the regions 
with the most political power by pressing for 
the allocation of resources. This solution is 
clearly the antithesis of planning and in no 
way benefits the neediest regions; it is also 
an inefficient solution if the criteria of 
regional efficiency now in vogue are ac-
cepted. 
The alternative solution is to use a 
supraregional level of authority to arbitrate a 
rational solution. This is precisely one of the 
main functions of the national regional plan 
or the regional development strategy at the 
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national level and, therefore, of the central 
regional planning agency. The need to settle 
this kind of conflict at a supraregional and 
interregional decision-making level may be 
substantiated on very solid grounds by 
invoking some fundamental postulates of 
systems theory or the more traditional 
concepts of external economic elements 
within the framework of a concept of general 
equilibrium. 
In any regional development strategy or 
plan at the national level the following 
factors are determined outside the region: (i) 
the region's objectives, particularly in con-
nexion with its expected contribution to-
wards attaining the most important national 
objectives; (ii) the regional global growth 
targets, sectoral goals and corresponding 
investment funds; (iii) the region's role in 
the national development process, deriving 
from the first two points. This role (or 
"scenario", in the language of MPCRD, 
developed by UNCRD) may —in aggregate 
terms— be positive if it means greater 
importance for the region in the national 
context than in the past, moderate if it means 
keeping the region's relative importance at 
the same level, or negative if it means a 
decline in the region's relative role. Here 
again a distinction must be made between 
absolute and relative situations, since a 
negative role could nevertheless mean abso-
lute regional growth. 
If it is considered that, in actual fact, a 
number of different roles are assigned to the 
region, we find —to make a sociological 
analogy— that what is really being defined is 
the regional status. This definition of region-
al status replaces or is a substitute for a 
traditional stage ofthe planning process: the 
establishment of objectives and goals. 
Since the assignment of the region's 
status presupposes a fairly passive position 
on the part ofthe region, there are here less 
clearly defined activities to be carried out by 
the working group concerned with prepar-
ing the regional plan. However, the assign-
ment or establishment ofthe region's status 
is not as unilateral as might be thought at first 
sight. The objectives, goals and resources 
assigned to each region in the national-level 
regional development plan or strategy in-
volve an iterative process (short or long) with 
information feedback between the local 
planning bodies and the central regional 
planning agency. 
Regional status may be defined either 
more or less explicitly, depending on the 
formal approach adopted to the question of 
regional planning at the national level. 
If a true regional development plan has 
been prepared at the national level, the 
information on the objectives, goals, poli-
cies, programmes and projects envisaged for 
the region will be highly detailed and 
regional action will be practically confined 
to comparing the analysis of its own situation 
(as derived from the diagnosis) with the 
proposals contained in the interregional 
plan and, if no major differences are observ-
able, supporting the process to be followed 
as regards the implementation of program-
mes and projects. This situation seldom 
arises, however, what generally happens is 
that the treatment of regional problems at the 
national level is expressed in documents 
which are along considerably more general 
lines, in the form of policy "guidelines" or 
development "strategies". 
What role does the image-objective of 
the region play in the above context? If 
image-objective is understood to mean a 
voluntaristic model of the real situation 
subject to planning (the region), it is clear 
that such a model would be characterized 
by: (i) the "state" ofthe variables it includes 
(the objectives); (ii) their consistency (ra-
tionality ofthe image); and (iii) the implicit 
strategy for attaining the image (viability of 
the image). 
Once again it-may be observed that this 
basic component of traditional planning, i.e., 
the image-objective, becomes a less impor-
tant element in the context ofthe planning of 
a region. It is useful in any case to prepare an 
image-objective for the region, but its role 
will be reduced to helping to identify the 
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agents of the environment rather than be-
coming the rule which conditions (and is 
conditioned by) the strategy. The regional 
status or scenario is a more useful concept 
than that of the image-objective, at least from 
the operational point of view. 
IV 
Some political aspects of the planning 
of a single region 
Any planning action is both a technical and a 
political activity. Since this view is univer-
sally accepted today, the following question 
might be asked: what is new about putting 
forward this position in the context of the 
planning of a region? There are two answers 
to this question. 
Firstly, in bringing to light the political 
aspects of the planning process in a region, 
this makes it easier to analyze the conflicts, 
transactions and agreements which exist, not 
in society as a whole, but within its techno-
bureaucratic system, or more precisely with-
in the public administration apparatus. 
"The invested interests of existing gov-
ernment agencies, particularly national 
agencies, will usually be deeply rooted and 
at times may be more of an impediment (to 
the plan) than the opposition of political or 
private power interests. An unco-operative 
attitude (on the part of such agencies) may be 
expected because first, the regional plan-
ning and development agency tends to be 
considered an instrument that will reduce 
the powers of the existing agencies, and 
second, the jurisdictions of regional orga-
nizations of the other government agencies 
generally do not coincide with those design-
ed for the regional plan" (Mayne, 1973). 
The above quotation is emphatic in 
pointing out the political problem faced by 
regional planning within the administration 
itself. This does not, of course, mean 
ignoring the iact that a regional development 
plan will often arouse strong political op-
position from other sectors not directly 
linked to the government, but that occurs in a 
much broader context on which a great deal 
of literature exists. The more restricted but 
no less important problem of the battle, inter 
pares, between national agencies and execu-
tives on the one hand and regional agencies 
and executives on the other has been given 
much less attention by the specialists. There 
is here, then, an element which distin-
guishes between the way "politics" enters 
into global planning and regional planning. 
Secondly, it is a fact that regional 
planning (on a national scale) can be used, 
explicitly or implicitly, for two completely 
opposite political purposes, to which the 
planner cannot be indifferent. Thus, region-
al planning at the national level can be used 
as yet another liturgical element in the cult 
of centralization and State control, conse-
quently helping to create an essentially anti-
democratic society, but it can also be used as 
an element for the democratization of socie-
ty, to the extent that it is associated with 
clearly defined and realistic schemes for the 
territorial decentralization of the decision-
making power. No matter how the concept of 
democracy is defined, there is no doubt that 
it is associated with a universal possibility of 
acceding to the generation of power and to 
power itself, if not in strictly individual 
terms, at least through organizations inter-
mediate between the individual person and 
the State. The region is precisely such an 
organization. 
The following are some interesting 
comments on how a regional planning 
system can be used for essentially anti-
democratic purposes, even in what may be 
considered a showcase democracy: 
"A religion, the State, whose hallowed 
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name covers the whole country. And, inevi-
tably, the organization most suited to this 
entity; military-style centralization. France 
obeys a Headquarters: Paris. In Paris all the 
information is collected, together all the 
country's movements are charted on a map as 
if'they were troop movements; from Paris are 
issued all the orders and directives given by 
the General Staff; the ministers, whose 
appointments are approved by the com-
mander-in-chief, the President of the Repub-
lic, address themselves to their generals, 
the Prefects, who entrust the execution of 
the orders and directives to officers of 
different ranks: colonels (the so-called high 
government officials), majors, captains, etc.; 
whi le in the lower echelons, there are 
innumerable non-commissioned officers 
and minor officials of all categories" (quoted 
by Servan-Schreiber, 1971). 
The same well-known French journalist 
and political figure adds the following: 
"The Government is well aware of the 
demands for local freedoms that are making 
themselves heard throughout the country 
and tries to create an illusion of a response by 
means of what it calls 'déconcentration', The 
confusion is skilfully maintained. 
"Déconcentration means the measures 
aimed at transferring to local government 
officials certain powers that were formerly 
assigned to a ministry; their real effect, 
however, is to increase powers of the 
Prefects. 
"Decentralization, in contrast, tends to 
bring about a redistribution of democratic 
power from the State to the local communi-
ties. The difference is obvious. On the one 
hand, the delegation of signature powers to a 
government official is a matter which con-
cerns neither the citizens nor the elected 
local representatives; on the other hand, the 
strengthening of rights linked with the 
legitimacy deriving from universal suffrage 
is a matter which directly concerns us all" 
(Servan-Schreiber, 1971). 
There can be no doubt whatever that the 
whole question of "centralization versus 
decentralization" is of basic importance in 
regional planning. In a matter of this kind, 
however, care must be taken to avoid 
romantic, idealistic positions which some-
times simply hide an attack on the role of the 
State as a development promoting agent. 
Both the centralization of the decision-
making process (in the public sector) and the 
territorial and functional decentralization of 
the process have their merits and disadvan-
tages. One role of regional planning which is 
a challenge to regional planners, is precisely 
that of determining the point of equilibrium 
that will preserve the necessary degree of 
centralization in certain decisions and the no 
less necessary degree of decentralization 
which must be introduced into the system to 
make it more democratic. 
It would be presumptuous, as well as 
completely outside the scope of this paper, 
to enter into a detailed analysis of the factors 
leading to a high level of centralization, but 
mention must be made at least of some of the 
most obvious ones. 
In the first place, it may be observed that 
territorial centralization of the decision-
making apparatus is the logical and neces-
sary counterpart of the process of territorial 
concentration of the production process. 
Since the latter is virtually a necessary 
condition for growth, centralization is almost 
inevitable. 
Of even greater importance, perhaps, is 
the relationship between centralization and 
national unity. Many of the developing 
countries are still in the nation-building 
stage, and consolidation of this process 
requires a strong central power (would it be 
possible to conceive of modern France 
without reference to the overwhelming 
power of Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Riche-
lieu ?), capable of imposing its will over 
tribalism and regionalism of a distinctly 
separatist nature. To some extent, today's 
centralization is the price of national unity. 
From an essentially technical angle, two 
other factors may be added which operate in 
favour of the centralizing trends. On the one 
hand, technical progress has tended to 
broaden the scale of decisions so that many 
REGIONAL PLANNING: WHAT CAN WE DO BEFORE MIDNIGHT STRIKES? / Sergio Boisier 153 
decisions connected with investment pro-
jects, both in the infrastructure and in 
directly productive sectors, go beyond the 
local, provincial or regional scale and are 
thus converted into interregional or national 
decisions (for example, a large-scale hydro-
electric plant). Clearly, such decision-
making scales involve centralized decisions 
which can at least internalize for the system 
their possible external factors. On the other 
hand, the theoretical and empirical recogni-
tion of the systemic nature of the whole set of 
regions again makes it necessary to transfer 
the capacity for guiding the system (deci-
sion-making powers) to higher government 
levels, that is to say, centralization is 
necessary in order to optimize the running of 
the whole system. This, however, is an 
argument which should not be carried too 
far. It is quite possible, by means of multi-
level planning systems, to find intermediate 
points corresponding to semi-decentralized 
systems; what happens in practice, however, 
is that it is "easier" to centralize than to 
operate a multiple system. 
How, then, can we avoid an excessive 
degree of centralization? What progress can 
be made towards decentralization without 
jeopardizing national unity and a given level 
of efficiency? What is the regional answer to 
centralization? Is its aim simply to secure a 
larger share of power? 
A possible answer to this type of 
question is given by Stóhr and Tódtling in 
their proposed "selective spatial closure" 
strategy. The basic issue raised by them is 
how the regions can defend themselves from 
centralized answers (to the specific prob-
lems of a region) which —in these authors' 
opinion— are necessarily stereotyped, not 
functional in relation to the region's real 
requirements and, consequently, socially 
disruptive. According to Stóhr and Tódtling, 
the centre's typical answer is biased in the 
sense of: (i) basing itself on concepts of 
neoclassical economic analysis; (ii) basing 
itself heavily on large-scale vertically or-
ganized institutions, either public or private; 
(iii) relying excessively on market mecha-
nisms and formal institutional processes; 
and (iv) placing excessive emphasis on 
economic achievements and material as-
pects. 
On the basis of the above considera-
tions, the authors propose a regional strategy 
aimed at "closing" the regions, including 
measures in the field of supply and demand 
and policy instruments to modify the friction 
caused by distance and redistribute the 
effects of the economies of scale and external 
economies (Stôhr and Tódtling, op. cit.). 
A prerequisite of this strategy, as noted 
by the authors, is a transfer of decision-
making capacity from the predominantly 
functional or vertical units (sectors) to the 
horizontal (territorial) units at various levels. 
This prerequisite seems somewhat unreal-
istic in practice, at any rate in the short term, 
since there appears to be no reason whatever 
for the national institutions to surrender part 
of their real power to territorial organiza-
tions. A full analysis of this type of strategy 
was made by Hilhorst in his comments on 
the above-mentioned study (Hilhorst, 1977), 
Even though the transfer of power to 
territorial organizations seems impractica-
ble, however, it may be possible to strength-
en the regional power by means of alterna-
tive mechanisms and perhaps arrive indi-
rectly at similar results to those pursued by 
Stohr and Tódtling. This is precisely the aim 
of the strategy of maximizing the regional 
bargaining power. 
V 
Regional negotiation strategy 
If the central purpose of the planning regional bargaining power vis-à-vis 
process of a region is to strengthen the agents of the parametric environment, t 
the 
ques-
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tions such as the following must be an-
swered: Who negotiates orwhoconducts the 
process on behalf of the region? What is 
negotiated with each agent? What practical 
measures can be taken to provide the poorest 
regions with the indispensable technical 
know-how to back up the negotiation? 
The bargaining process must, of course, 
be conducted by the regional political au-
thority. This simple statement, however, 
involves a number of complex issues. 
A step prior to the establishment of 
formal negotiating machinery is to imbue the 
community with a sense oíregional identity, 
i.e., a collective sense of belonging to a 
geographical entity characterized by com-
mon cultural forms and territorial loyalties. 
This is essential for establishing regional 
legitimacy, without which a process of 
regional negotiation cannot be established. 
As might be guessed, the previous 
paragraph points directly at the definition of 
a region as a basic condition for it to be able 
to negotiate, or for the negotiation really to 
represent the region, as a social entity, 
instead of representing only the thinking of 
planners. We will not go any further into this 
subject, which has in any case been thorough-
ly analysed, but it is necessary to stress the 
importance of how a region should be 
defined, and also to remember the many 
examples of the failure of regionalization 
processes which have overlooked the prob-
lems of regional identify. 
"The legitimacy of the institutions and 
authority of a government are necessary 
means for achieving a substantive aim, a 
social programme or project that will arouse 
a national society's will to change. Without 
this, planning may be a fascinating scientific 
discipline but it will not be linked with the 
political action of the State" (Botana, quoted 
by Boeninger, 1976). 
An indispensable condition for estab-
lishing a process of negotiation is the 
existence of the will of the parties concerned 
to negotiate. It is assumed that the region has 
a genuine desire to negotiate, but is this so in 
the case of the other parties, the government, 
enterprises, etc.? It seems clear that a 
negotiation process such as that proposed 
means that it must take place within a certain 
political system. In view of the unequal 
power relationship between the region and 
the government, for example, the latter will 
only be willing to negotiate when the 
implicit cost-benefit ratio of the negotiation 
is higher than that of the use of authoritarian 
force. This situation may derive from a 
doctrinary conviction (democracy) or from 
tactical considerations (even the strongest 
and most authoritarian governments consid-
er it best, on occasions, to avoid forcible 
solutions). However, not only is the will to 
negotiate required in order for the negotia-
tion to take place; it is also necessary to 
define a common area of transaction for all 
the agents of the parametric environment, in 
the light of the set of resources, interests and 
symbols possessed by each negotiating 
party. 
The task of defining this area will once 
again fall mainly on the region, as the 
principal party interested in negotiating. 
Unfortunately, negotiating techniques are 
still in their infancy (except for the games 
theory in certain cases), so there is no clear 
guide for conducting the negotiations, nor 
for solving deadlock situations, except in a 
few particular cases (Isard and Smith, 1976). 
An important question here is that of the 
regional authority's representativeness for 
conducting the negotiation process. Who 
does the regional authority represent? If the 
authority is elected, the representativeness 
derives from an electoral consensus and the 
higher the consensus the higher the repre-
sentativeness, but if the authority is ap-
pointed, either through an established insti-
tutional mechanism or by ad hoc procedures, 
this power must be legitimized in the eyes of 
the regional community. It should be re-
membered that in any country with a unitary 
system of government, the regional authority 
is designated by the Executive and repre-
sents the Executive in the region; this must 
be altered so that the authority also repre-
sents the region in its relations with the 
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Executive, which is something that cannot 
be achieved by decree. 
The basis oflegitimacy and structure of 
power of the political system affects the 
nature and possibilities of the plan, not only 
because they help to create inequalities in 
the capacity of the various social agents to 
acquire or maintain their status as such 
agents (Boeninger, op. cit.), but because they 
directly affect the capacity to influence the 
( exogenous ) adoption of decisions. 
One way of increasing the representa-
tiveness of the authority or legitimizing its 
power may be sought through the social 
activation of the region, i.e., through the 
region's incorporation into the whole plan-
ning process (it will be remembered that we 
already mentioned this point in the diagno-
sis) and its consequent mobilization in 
support of its authorities (not necessarily 
through the use of pressure mechanisms). 
What is required is activation on the basis of 
a dialogue and the pursuit of a common 
destiny for the region, and no regional group 
can be excluded from this dialogue. Regio-
nal development councils, if they exist, can 
be of valuable assistance in social activation, 
provided that they are also truly represen-
tative. 
"A plan which calls for mobilization 
must also be capable of channeling the 
consequent participation, and this involves 
the complex task of setting up social organi-
zations capable of co-ordinating the de-
mands of the mobilized agents, while it also 
entails establishing a harmonious relation-
ship between their aspirations and the goals 
envisaged in the plan. This requirement is, 
in its turn, linked with the reconciliation of 
political intermediary organizations (gener-
ally political parties) and bodies responsi-
ble for corporate representation and, in a 
different perspective, with the relations 
between the ruling élites or minorities and 
the broad masses at the social base'' (Boenin-
ger, op. cit.). 
Enhancing the level of representa-
tiveness of the regional authority is also 
imperative in order to facilitate its access to 
the central decision-making level. There is a 
big difference between dealing with the 
Minister of Finance when backed by a 
powerful and cohesive regional movement 
and dealing with him when backed only by 
one's official title. Even so, political support 
alone is not very effective in negotiating if at 
the same time the regional negotiator lacks 
technical arguments. 
"Persuasion and the social pact or con-
tract, backed by the accumulated weight of 
technical experience and the utilization to 
the full, as a power resource, of the prestige 
provided by scientific knowledge, are per-
haps the most effective instruments in a 
basically consensual society" (Boeninger, 
op. cit.). 
The second question in relation to 
regional negotiation is what can be negoti-
ated and how. This will usually depend on the 
nature of the agent of the parametric en-
vironment with whom the negotiation is to 
take place. 
Before specifying what can be negoti-
ated with each agent, the region should 
prepare a general scheme of negotiation. 
This involves defining a regional model, in 
this case strongly conditioned by factors 
outside the region. In the definition of this 
model three groups of factors will be 
considered: (i) the results of the diagnosis, 
particularly those connected with the identi-
fication of the region's potentialities; (ii) the 
projects under way in the region and new 
ideas for projects —with differing degrees of 
precision— which have emerged from the 
diagnosis itself, and (iii) information on 
objectives, policies, programmes and pro-
jects contained in what has been called 
regional status, i.e., information on the 
national-level regional development plan or 
strategy. 
The roles of the region, growth targets, 
general and specific policies (for the region), 
national projects which will definitely or 
probably be located in the region, regional 
development potential, projects of regional 
origin, and the changes envisaged in re-
gional macroeconomic variables such as 
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income, employment and the use of space 
(including the rate and form of urbanization) 
constitute some factors and elements which 
should be incorporated in the construction 
of the regional model to provide a coherent 
basis for the negotiation process. 
Let us now see what happens in the 
case of the agents with whom the region 
negotiates. We will begin with the national 
government, which is usually the principal 
agent. Assuming, as above, that investment 
in directly productive activities is carried 
out, in the case of the public sector, by 
public enterprises, the concept of the na-
tional government used here is close to the 
concept of the fiscal sector. 
The region can negotiate with the 
national government in the first place on the 
question of the territorial modification of 
some economic policies and some economic 
policy instruments, i.e., the regionalization 
of economic policies, on which point the 
following comments are worth reproducing: 
"One of the essential features of any 
developing country is the marked 
heterogeneity of its economic and social 
structures. Computation centres and 
nuclear power stations go side by side 
with an agriculture in which the driving 
force is still provided mainly by human 
beings and draft animals. Ultramodern 
cities are surrounded by belts of pover-
ty, élite intellectual groups exist at the 
same time as high percentages of illit-
eracy, abysmal differences in income 
occur between sectors and persons, 
there is no "spatial friction" for high-
income groups in contrast with the 
absolute geographical immobility of 
the majority, etc. In other words, this 
fits in with the well-known journalistic 
picture of underdevelopment in Latin 
America. 
"Faced with this situation —repre-
sented here in extreme form— the 
economic planners and those who are 
in general responsible for the conduct 
of economic policy have gradually 
become aware of a phenomenon which 
was largely unnoticed in the past, 
namely, that the great majority of the 
usual instruments of economic policy, 
such as taxes, subsidies, exchange rates 
and others of the kind, were designed 
to operate in economic and social situa-
tions with a high degree of homoge-
neity, typical of more or less comparable 
conditions, characteristic in their turn 
of well-integrated and developed econ-
omies. Very different is the econom-
ic and social milieu of the developing 
countries, characterized in part, on the 
one hand, as described above, by im-
portant heterogeneous features, and on 
the other by monopolistic structures. It 
should be quite obvious that in this 
case averages, which serve as a basis 
for the aggregate use of economic policy 
instruments, are quite inadequate to 
convey the situation and consequently 
constitute an inefficient basis for econom-
ic decision-making. What is more, 
the administration of a country on the 
basis of averages and homogeneous 
measures tends to become confined to 
the administration of the more devel-
oped regions, thus speeding up *the 
cumulative process of concentration. 
"In conditions of extreme heterogeneity 
a case could almost be made for the 
use of practically individual economic 
policy instruments, but obviously this 
is not feasible and consequently it is 
the region which becomes an efficient 
geographic and economic unit for the 
administration of an economic policy 
based somewhere between the inef-
ficiency and injustice of a homoge-
neous aggregate and the impossibility-
of complete differentiation." (Boisier, 
1976, b.) 
The foregoing considerations lead to the 
conclusion that the regions, and particularly 
the less developed ones, must equip them-
selves to negotiate with the national govern-
ment an efficient means of territorial 
differentiation in the application of certain 
economic policy instruments. 
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To achieve this, the regional negotiating 
authority must be able to convince the 
central economic authorities, on a technical 
basis, that a mechanism of territorial dif-
ferentiation will not affect the attainment of 
the overall objectives envisaged in the use of 
a given economic policy instrument. More-
over, it must show that the benefits deriving 
from a measure of this kind would outweight 
the higher administrative costs of its ap-
plication and control. 
It is quite possible that a proposal of 
this kind would be resisted by the economic 
authorities owing to its apparent complexity, 
The fact is, however, that there is already 
differentiation in not a few aspects of 
economic administration (tax rates, tariffs, 
etc.) and there is no good reason why this 
experience should not be put at the service 
of the regions. 
An interesting example of how policies 
of a homogeneous type come to favour 
sectors, groups or individuals different from 
those who were presumably the original 
object of the policy occurs in the field of 
public education. For many years it was 
maintained that primary education should 
be free of charge in order to give effect to 
the principle of equality of opportunity, and 
this principle served as the banner of not a 
few political campaigns. Later it was dem-
onstrated (thanks to the economists) that if 
the distribution of wealth and income is 
regressive, free education comes to be a 
subsidy for pupils from better-off families, 
since those who come from poorer families 
cannot remain within the school system. 
Thus, in an initial very heterogeneous 
situation (income distribution in this case) 
and in the absence of lateral compensatory 
mechanisms (scholarships, for example), a 
policy conceived as an impartial and imper-
sonal measure for all comes to favour in the 
end the very people who do not require 
help. 
In the second place, the region can 
negotiate with the national government to 
define a set of location decisions related to 
investment projects contemplated in sec-
toral plans- The reasons for this are a 
follows: 
The development strategies and plans 
of the sectoral planning agencies currently 
include more or less complete lists of 
investment projects. Here it is important 
to note that, with the exception of energy and 
mining projects and certain agricultural 
projects whose location is predetermined by 
the existence of resources, there still re-
mains a very large group of projects, par-
ticularly those of an industrial, nature, 
whose location admits of a considerable 
degree of freedom. 
With the background and analysis 
provided by the diagnosis, and after study-
ing the list of sectoral projects, a region 
might put forward a list of the locational 
elements which the region has to offer for 
each project (regional inputs, regional 
markets, energy, manpower, infrastructure, 
etc.) so as to start a kind of interregional 
competition (a sort of public bidding) to 
obtain the assignment of such projects. It 
is worth recalling that this competition 
actually takes place every day, but based 
entirely on positions of force. The idea in 
this case is to replace this contest of strength 
(which is naturally always won by the 
most powerful regions) by a rational com-
petition on technical bases. A noteworthy 
example of the use of this mechanism is the 
petrochemical complex at Bahía (Brazil). 
On the other hand, care must be taken to 
see that this interregional competition for 
projects does not become a regular "auc-
tion" in which each region strives to beat 
the offer of other regions, no matter what the 
cost. This might end by benefiting only the 
private sector (national and transnational 
enterprises) while the region which "wins" 
the tender gets none of the potential benefits 
envisaged. Concrete examples of this could 
be cited in various Latin American coun-
tries. 
In the third place, the region can nego-
tiate with the national government to secure 
the modification of administrative proce-
dures which might be hampering the ac-
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celeration of regional growth. This relates 
almost entirely to bureaucratic processes, 
where a balance must be obtained between 
the necessary.centralization of some deci-
sional aspects and the no less necessary 
territorial decentralization of other aspects 
of such processes. The examples which 
might be quoted are too well known and 
numerous to be repeated, but in any case 
it would seem that decentralization of the 
public budget should have some priority 
in this respect. 
Finally, both the regional allocation of 
public investment in infrastructure and 
social facilities and the current government 
expenditure on wages, purchase of mate-
rials, etc. are also areas in which the region 
may negotiate. 
The second most important agent in the 
regional environment may be that made up 
of the public enterprises, whether or not 
located in the region. With regard to these 
enterprises, the negotiation will include 
discussions on the possibilities of an in-
crease in production (subject to market 
conditions), new investments, and especial-
ly the greater economic and technological 
integration of these enterprises in the re-
gional economy. Why does this or that 
enterprises buy a good part of its inputs 
outside the region when equivalent inputs 
are available in the region? Why are certain 
advisory services contracted outside the 
region, when similar regional services exist? 
This situation sometimes derives from mere 
administrative routines and not from fun-
damental causes. This type of question 
should be formulated by the regional work-
ing team in order to be able to present 
viable alternatives to those with whom they 
are negotiating. No less important in this 
case is the discussion of the selection of 
technologies by public enterprises and their 
impact on regional employment. 
Similar negotiations may be carried on 
with the national and foreign private enter-
prises and the private institutions of the 
financial sector. 
The external market (both national and 
international) can represent an agent of 
considerable importance for the region, 
especially if the region in question has a 
clear export potential. The difficulty in 
negotiating with an agent like this lies in its 
diffused character, but an effort may be 
made, first, to identify the location of the 
external markets for each of the principal 
export products of the region (if a regional 
product has national importance as an 
exportable commodity, its market situation 
will doubtless be handled by the national 
government or by large companies) and, 
secondly, to identify the main marketing 
systems (companies specializing in interna-
tional trade or in wholesale national distri-
bution) with which negotiations might be 
started to increase regional exports. 
What can the region offer in these 
negotiations? This is a crucial question 
difficult to answer. The region does not, as 
a rule, possess material assets which could 
be traded, but it does have some non-
material elements which are of interest to 
the agents on the other side. 
To the national government and the 
public enterprises the region may offer the 
possibility of rationalization of the pres-
surizing process (which in the long run 
becomes intolerable to governments) and 
the attraction of more efficient use of 
national resources. After all, one must not 
forget that many of the efforts made on 
behalf of regional development are aimed 
at providing ad-hoc solutions in response to 
political pressures expressed in various 
ways. 
Additionally, in certain cases the sheer 
reasonableness brought out in the regional 
diagnosis might enable the region to show 
the central government that the apparent 
subsidy to the region (as a simple difference 
between regional receipts and public ex-
penditure) might be transformed in the 
medium term into a profitable deal for the 
State, if the flow of financial resources 
were put to more practical use than in the 
past. At the same time, the regional diagnosis 
might help to establish such important 
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points as the reduced cost of a process of 
productive and administrative déconcentra-
tion, in contrast to prevailing beliefs on the 
subject. 
For the national and foreign private 
enterprises, associating themselves with a 
regional development process would give 
them the opportunity of improving their 
public image (a very important aspect, 
particularly for the large international 
corporations), and creating a better climate 
lor business and for establishing good 
labour relations: in short, a more stable and 
favourable atmosphere for their own de-
velopment. 
In every case it is most important to 
make an effort to define the common ground 
for bargaining, i.e., what can be offered and 
what can reasonably be demanded by each 
agent. 
If it is possible to carry through the 
negotiating process, the region will have at 
its disposal a set of commitments and 
decisions pertaining to each agent in the 
parametric environment. Some of these 
commitments and decisions will be more 
concrete and specific than others. It will be 
useful at this stage to prepare a list of the 
results of all the negotiations, identifying in 
each case the agent involved in each result 
and the time sequence envisaged for each 
action or for each preparatory step towards it. 
VI 
Following-up the commitments and actions 
The main task of the regional planners will 
henceforth be to follow up the execution of 
this set of decisions. The monitoring and 
consequent assessment of the implementa-
tion of the decisions must be regarded not 
as a sporadic process involving an analysis 
every three or six months, but as a continu-
ing daily process, and the information 
about it should be constantly fed back to the 
regional authority. The regional authority's 
role of negotiator does not end with the 
previous stage: its work is not over when the 
commitments and decisions have been 
secured. It is also a continuing role which 
now implies daily inter-agency co-ordina-
tion and continuing negotiation with the 
agents of the parametric environment to 
settle problems of delays, lack of imple-
mentation, and other matters. 
Obviously in this process of negotiated 
planning the "plan" as a formal document is 
of less importance, while the monitoring 
instruments and processes assume supreme 
importance. It is thus the process of negotia-
tion and monitoring which constitutes the 
outstanding feature of this mode of planning. 
In view of the importance of the moni-
toring aspect in this planning process, the 
capacity of the executive machinery of the 
region consequently becomes decisive for 
the success or failure of the whole process. 
On this point, with reference to the case of 
the State of Minas Gérais (Brazil), a spe-
cialist who is similarly dissatisfied with the 
traditional forms of planning writes: 
"The implementation of a planned 
policy which has been politically ap-
proved requires the existence of an 
executive agency and of a plan which is 
sufficiently detailed to be put into 
effect. 
"In a market economy, where most of 
the decisions on production are taken by 
the private sector, the action of the State 
is basically aimed at inducing private 
activity. Apart from correcting market 
deficiencies, the public sector tries to 
take action which will be simplified or 
multiplied by the response of the pri-
vate sector. 
"This inductive character may be nega-
tive or positive, just as the errors and 
defects of an inefficient public mecha-
nism become amplified in the same way 
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as the positive effects oi an efíicient 
mechanism. 
"What is sought is on the one hand to 
correct market deficiencies and on the 
other to obtain a multiplier effect of 
public action on private activity. 
"The high sensitivity of the private 
sector to public action makes it neces-
sary to seek maximum efficiency of the 
latter, especially in the case of a regional 
economy where most of the policy 
instruments affecting private activity 
are in the hands of the central power. 
"When the planning activity is initiated, 
the new forms of rationality which it is 
sought to establish come up against the 
traditional obstacles to decision-making 
within the public machinery. The past 
performance of the latter has by no 
means been devoid of merit, and in 
many cases high levels of efficiency 
have been attained by executive agen-
cies or units. When an attempt is made to 
impose a broader rationality —in keep-
ing with a global outlook— incorporat-
ing elements which are normally be-
yond the scope of these units, however, 
sources of tension arise which need to 
be resolved in order to achieve the 
proper development of the plan. 
"The public machinery, for its part, is 
not a monolithic system responsible 
hierarchically to the summit where 
policy decisions are made, but is re-
sponsible rather to a group of centres 
seeking a negotiated equilibrium. This 
gives agility and creativity to the public 
sector and therefore to the executive 
process, but it can also create great 
difficulties which have to be foreseen 
and fors tal led. 
' 'Among the most important factors 
which condition the capacity of the 
public machinery the following should 
be mentioned: (a) the leadership ca-
pacity of the political decision-making 
centres; (b) the technical capacity of 
the group; (c) its endowment of re-
sources; (d) its organization and the 
instruments at the disposal of the polit-
ical decision-making centre to activate 
the public machine in the execution of 
the plan. 
"The process of change of the historic 
modes of decision-making into planned 
forms requires a great capacity for 
leadership in order to secure agree-
ments and negotiate new forms of 
equilibrium which enable the potential 
of the public machinery to be mobilized 
for the execution of the plan. The plan 
cannot be made into a rigid normative 
instrument which is imposed hierarchi-
cally, but must be understood, assimi-
lated, and supported by the executive 
units, and this requires a great effort 
of persuasion and leadership. 
"The public machinery must have the 
technical capacity to complete the final 
draft of the development plan, ade-
quately formulating programmes and 
projects, or it should have the technical 
capacity to contract these studies. The 
public sector should also be prepared 
to carry out the stage of execution, either 
with its own resources or through 
contracts. 
"Normally the technical capacity of the 
public machinery is consistent with the 
characteristics of the non-planned 
development of the past, with some 
sectors at a very high level —such as 
usually the sector of physical infra-
structure and energy— and with a very 
low level in those sectors generally 
left behind in spontaneous develop-
ment. When the planning process 
attempts to correct these sectoral im-
balances, the technically weaker sectors 
inevitably call for greater efforts, es-
pecially in the formulation of program-
mes and projects. If this situation is not 
realized in advance and measures are 
not taken to increase their technical 
capacity, it will not be possible to 
invest the new resources which may be 
allocated in these sectors, in contrast 
with the situation in the sectors with 
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traditionally higher capacity. This situa-
tion only strengthens the historical 
imbalances which the aim is to correct, 
instead of eliminating them. 
"This type of problems is not very 
noticeable in a very conservative plan-
ning system, where the sectoral im-
balances are acknowledged in the plan 
and no solution is proposed for them, 
but matters are different in the case of 
development programmes basically 
designed to correct the imbalances of 
historic growth. It goes without saying 
that the financial resources required for 
the operation of the public machinery 
and the execution of the plan must be 
strictly equated to the needs of the 
programme. 
"Nevertheless, it is usual to find that the 
plan is obstructed and hampered by the 
current budgetary procedures. This is 
easily understandable if one takes into 
account the relative antiquity of bud-
getary procedures compared with plan-
ning techniques. 
"Traditionally, and almost universally, 
the budgetary estimates are prepared on 
an annual basis, but normally a plan 
requires the commitment of resources 
for a longer period. In a situation where 
the budget is a fundamental tool for 
financial administration this can easily 
give rise to conflict between the finan-
cial policies and the development 
policy proposed in the plan. There is 
thus an imperative necessity for close 
collaboration between the financial and 
the planning authorities. 
"Even when leadership capacity, 
financial resources and technical ex-
perts are available it is important also 
that the organization of the public sector 
should be equal to the tasks involved in 
disaggregating and executing the plan. 
This form of organization should permit 
an adequate flow of information from 
the summit to the base and vice versa 
and should be based on a hierarchical 
structure of decision-making in line 
with the conception of systems and 
subsystems (programmes, subprogram-
mes and projects) into which the plan 
has been disaggregated. 
"The summit of this system should 
have action mechanisms effective and 
speedy enough to be able to carry out 
the plan satisfactorily in the face of 
distortions and reactions in the different 
elements of the system. These mecha-
nisms may cover legal, administrative, 
financial, information, co-ordination, 
advisory and other aspects, and their 
existence and characteristics are the 
basic condition for effective control of 
the execution of the plan." (Calderón, 
1976.) 
The process as described so far is not 
simple, but neither is it beyond the capacity 
of a reasonably well trained team, always 
provided that the political authority of the 
region is genuinely involved in the ex-
periment. After all, negotiation is a familiar 
process, perhaps usually less systematic and 
formal, but nevertheless involving a similar 
procedure. One may indeed quote some 
concrete and successful experiments, as, for 
example, the way in which the development 
of the State of Bahia in Brazil has been 
approached, and about which a specialist 
writes as follows: 
"The viability of the strategic concept 
of regional development depends in 
great part on the realism timeliness 
with which the interrelations between 
the regional and the national economy 
are handled. In countries like Brazil, 
endowed with extraordinarily dynamic 
growth, transitory economic changes 
are very frequent, compelling the region 
to develop its own analytical capacity 
and mechanisms to ensure a swift and 
timely political intervention. This is 
essential if the region is to take advan-
tage of the dynamic factors of exogenous 
growth and avoid as far as possible the 
depressive effects which frequently a«_ 
company foreign investments within a 
model of dependent growth. 
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"In practice, within this type of model, 
the actions of the public and private 
peripheral sectors consists essentially 
of responses or reactions to actions 
deriving from the centre. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that the 
response cannot be creative or in-
novative in so far as they are realistic 
and are based on the capacity to take 
advantage of the opportunities occasion-
ally provided by the development of the 
centre. 
"The possibility of creating this dia-
lectic capacity in underdeveloped 
regions of countries which are them-
selves underdeveloped might seem 
Utopian if it were not that the lack of 
policital rationality need not necessarily 
stem from underdevelopment. The 
existence of economic liberation pro-
cesses in countries which were originally 
capitalized by foreign investment and, 
on another level, experiments such as 
that of the petrochemical industry in 
Bahía, indicate that it is possible, though 
admittedly by no means easy, to give 
rise to growing processes of economic 
autonomy beginning from investment 
concentrations generated by external 
factors. 
"To make all this possible, however, it is 
necessary to introduce institutional 
changes in the technical and adminis-
trative procedures of the region. In the 
first place, it will be necessary to 
provide the region with a permanent 
capacity for analysing the regional 
economy and the national situation. 
There is no development plan or econom-
ic diagnosis which does not have to be 
systematically and periodically revised 
in order to be adapted to the dynamic 
nature of development. Regional devel-
opment strategy needs a modern infor-
mation system and instruments of 
analysis. The underdeveloped regions 
do not possess, for example, systems of 
social accounting, nor means for the 
regional quantification of economic and 
social phenomena. Generally the scanty 
information available has such a low 
level of synthesis that it is practically 
useless for a study of the internal 
situation of the region. It is interesting 
to note that the degree of synthesis 
of information is always related to the 
interest of the user and therefore the 
present supply of statistics is deter-
mined by the interest of the centre and not 
of the region. 
"The establishment of institutions 
responsible for information and regional 
economic analysis is therefore indis-
pensable for the preparation, execution 
and continuous revision of a regional 
development strategy such as that 
which is suggested here. 
"It will also be necessary to introduce 
institutional reforms in the sphere of 
administration to raise the capacity of 
political intervention in questions as 
important as the central decisions 
which affect the region, the reinvest-
ment within the region of the product 
generated there, the generation of 
strategic projects, the location of eco-
nomic activity and the internal market. 
It will also be necessary to achieve 
greater political continuity and to 
expand the basis of participation in the 
processes of political decision-making, 
production and consumption. The 
incorporation of the local elite and of an 
ever-increasing labour force, the train-
ing of local personnel and the stimula-
tion of the development of regional 
technical services are ways of achieving 
greater integration and of promoting 
the growth of local capacity for initiative 
and identification with the region. 
"In many respects regional develop-
ment is a conflict of interests between a 
powerful centre and a periphery which 
needs to unite all its forces for an 
unequal battle. Only the integration of 
local capacities and a real sense of 
regional identity can produce the condi-
tions for success. This is especially the 
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case in strategic projects, which it would 
be difficult for technical groups from 
outside the region to identify and study. 
For this reason it is imperative to carry 
out the systematic training of technical 
cadres both in the public sector and in 
private enterprise. The development of 
a region in the present conditions 
requires a system of intellectual support 
formed by the technical-political élite 
of the government, the university and 
local firms of consultants. To create the 
conditions for the development of this 
system is one of the main responsibili-
ties of the public sector in the field of 
development. 
"In addition to increasing efficiency in 
the formulation of political options 
(regional analysis) and in the capacity 
for political action on the part of the 
administration, it will also be necessary 
to initiate a gradual process of improve-
ment in the internal administrative 
system and the methods and procedures 
used in it. A programme of this type is 
essential to ensure that the reforms that 
might result from the two levels of 
action previously mentioned are con-
solidated in permanent form by the 
regional administration. The remodel-
ling of the administrative machinery of 
the region is always a lengthy process 
which needs continual renewal to adapt 
itself to the strategy. It may be that a start 
should be made with the programming 
system, beginning with the conversion 
of the general terms of the development 
strategy into sectoral goals and program-
mes at the level of the whole State 
(government programme), integrated in 
spatial programmes (microregions). In 
the case of Bahía, the Reconcavo area 
must be considered as a priority sub-
region where, as a preliminary hypo-
thesis, public sector investments should 
initially be concentrated. The budget 
should be prepared on the basis of a 
preliminary definition of programmes 
and the availability of resources. The co-
ordination of the execution of program-
mes and projects should constitute a 
parallel sub-system in the hand of co-
ordinating units in the central and 
decentralized executive agencies of the 
public sector. Finally, another sub-
system, that of assessment, should 
analyse the achievements of the pro-
grammes and projects at the end of each 
accounting period in order to incorpo-
rate the actual results of the process into 
the future programming. 
"All these tasks are of course difficult to 
carry out and require trained and psy-
chologically motivated personnel. But 
the difficulties should not be a reason for 
abandoning the effort to rationalize the 
development process, especially con-
sidering that this effort is one of the few 
instruments that can be used to achieve 
regional objectives and goals which 
otherwise would depende on the free 
play of external forces and the emergence 
of spontaneous solutions. Past ex-
perience provides enough examples to 
show that this form of development is 
far from efficient and cannot always 
ensure regional development even 
though there may be growth." (Neira, 
1972.) 
How could the technical capacity of the 
team entrusted with the planning of a region 
be improved in practice? Or how could a 
region be endowed with a qualified techni-
cal team? It is unquestionable that "negoti-
ated" regional planning requires trained 
personnel, and it is undeniable that in some 
cases certain regions face serious difficulties 
in this connexion. Various alternative 
measures may be suggested to deal with this 
problem. 
One way of endowing the neediest 
regions with technical capacity is to use the 
system of international technical co-opera-
tion, whether multilateral or bilateral. There 
is no doubt that organizations such as the 
United Nations and others of the kind have 
highly-trained personnel and are well placed 
to assist the regions in this sort of task, 
164 C E P A L REVIEW N.° 7 / April 1979 
which is perhaps potentially more fruitful 
than advisory services supplied to govern-
ments at a very general level. In the case of 
Latin America, the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) 
has carried out extensive and valuable work 
in this field. This type of assistance naturally 
requires the authorization of the central 
governments and therefore once again there 
is a need for the will to negotiate subse-
quently with the region. 
Another and extremely interesting pos-
sibility is the agreement of all the regions to 
create some type of institutional mechanism 
which represents the interests of the region-
al system vis-à-vis the Nation, and can con-
sequently supply technical assistance to 
specific regions. One of the most interesting 
practical examples of this is the Federal 
Investment Council of Argentina. This 
Council was set up by resolution of the 
Ministers of Finance of the Provinces of 
Argentina in 1959 and represents a political 
agreement between the Provinces which 
does not include the Nation (although it 
could do so). 
Following a similar line of interregional 
co-operation, coalitions of two or more 
regions with relatively complementary in-
terests could be formed. Such coalitions 
would improve the regional bargaining 
power in negotiations and permit the forma-
tion of technical teams combining the best 
human resources available. "It seems evi-
dent that, except in the most obstinate cases, 
the more the members of a group can put 
forward and maintain a common position in 
their negotiation with other groups, the 
stronger will be their bargaining power. This 
principle not only applies to the constitution 
and organization of local groups as part of the 
distribution process, but also to the agree-
ments between "competing" groups acting 
at the interregional or national level on the 
basis of which they can decide to divide the 
market between them or offer common 
prices or conditions". (Dunham, op. cit.) 
The method and procedure of "negoti-
ated" regional planning proposed and devel-
oped in the foregoing pages is not a magic 
formula of universal application. There are 
some cases in which it is not suitable, but it 
may be very useful if not in most cases, at 
least in a good number of practical situations. 
Each region and each situation has its 
individual features, and the general scheme 
will therefore need to be adapted to each 
concrete situation. We do hope, however, 
that it will provide a more viable, practical 
and direct reply to the challenging ques-
tions: How do I prepare a regional plan? 
"There will be rightist opponents who 
say that the people are incapable of 
learning, or that they do not wish to 
learn, and that it is the elites who must 
shoulder the responsibility of govern-
ment. Thus the problem is to strengthen 
the elites and endow them with better 
planning instruments, and wider po-
wers. There are leftist opponents who 
say that nothing can be done until the 
power of the corporations and the bour-
geois. State is destroyed by a victorious 
proletariat." 
John Friedmann: Innovación, respuesta flexible y 
aprendizaje social: un problema en la teoría de metapla-
nificación. (Innovation, flexible response and social 
apprenticeship: a problem in the theory of meta-
pl aiming.) 
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